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The co-management approach of managing natural resources has increasingly become 
popular among conservationists and development practitioners since it overcomes the 
shortcomings of both the centralised management and community-based approaches that 
hinder harmonization of conflicting interests among diverse stakeholder groups. 
Considering criteria developed from theoretical advancements on co-management and 
drawing on empirical studies conducted in Kenya, the paper examines how successful the 
co-management approach has been in terms of meeting the needs and interests of local 
communities and conservationists. Further, it analyses some of the factors or conditions 
that contribute towards the emergence and subsequent adoption of the co-management 
approach in the conservation and management of wildlife. These factors, which may also 
be important in other developing countries, include the provision of a favourable policy 
framework, institutional capacity of organized user groups to co-manage wildlife 
resources, land tenure conditions and accessibility to wildlife resources. It is emphasised 
that the co-management approach has had, so far, mixed results and there are certain 
important factors challenging its successful implementation in Kenya. 
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1  Introduction 
1.1   Evolution of Different Management Approaches of Wildlife Resources   
Searching for viable and sustainable strategies of wildlife conservation in developing 
countries, which are typically rich in biodiversity, traces back to the times when the fence 
and fines approach, also known as American National Park model, was commonly being 
applied (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996: 5; Songorwa 1999: 2061; Venema and van den Breemer, 
1999: 5). This led to the establishment of protected areas (PAs) or ‘fortress parks and 
reserves’ which did not condone wildlife consumptive utilisation and entailed high 
management costs for governments, with majority of the benefits not accruing to local 
communities. To enhance the biological integrity of the parks, this model has been adjusted 
to the more attractive “protected areas outreach” (PAO) model which encourages working 
and educating local communities and sharing with them some benefits (Barrow and 
Murphee, 2001: 32-33). However, with high population growth, governments’ shrinking 
budgets and subordination of natural resources to short-term economic or political interests, 
neither the PAs nor PAO has succeeded in curbing biodiversity loss (Baland and Platteau, 
1996: 420; Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 2001: 44-45). Thus, there has been a shift from this 
‘protectionist’ concept or states’ centralised management strategy towards a community-
based model, which emphasises on transfer of wildlife rights and responsibilities to local 
institutions.  
 
Over the past two decades, several developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have adopted 
the community-based approach, which is often implemented in form of integrated 
conservation and development projects (ICDPs). Such projects include the Communal Area 
Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe, Luangwa 
Integrated Rural Development Programme (LIRDP) in Zambia and Community-based 
Wildlife Management in Tanzania (CWM) (IIED, 1994; Virtanen, 2003). Although this 
approach has helped to tackle some of the shortcomings of the centralised and ‘protectionist’ 
approach, it has some significant limitations and obstacles to implementation and therefore 
some of the ICDPs have not been successful (Kiss, 1999: 14; Leach et al., 1999: 225; 
Songorwa 1999: 2062; Virtanen, 2003: 187). As documented by several authors (see for 
example Wainwright and Wehrmeyer, 1998: 934; Songorwa, 1999: 2068; Virtanen, 2003:  2
187), most of these ICDPs have not only experienced low community participation but have 
also failed to achieve their conservation and development objectives, and to produce 
sufficient benefits that can improve communities’ living standards.  
 
Thus, although at first the community-based approach seemed quite promising as an 
effective and efficient tool in achieving both biodiversity conservation and socio-economic 
development goals, many conservationists are now recommending its review. Further, 
biodiversity conservation funding organisations (e.g. World Bank, bilateral donors, etc.) and 
international conservation non-governmental organisations are calling for the application of 
a combination of the states’ centralised approach and the community-based models. 
Combining both models is regarded essential for ensuring sustainable biodiversity 
conservation since needs and interests of both conservation managers and local communities 
are fulfilled. ‘Dangers of decentralisation and devolution’ which arise due to certain 
resource characteristics (e.g. endangered species) could also be avoided (Lutz and Caldecott, 
1996: 2). In supporting this view, Kiss (1999: 14) argues that “community-based 
conservation activities are essential for generating political support for conservation and 
reducing and mitigating human-wildlife conflicts, but they can rarely, if ever, fully substitute 
for direct protection of unique and valuable biodiversity resources”. 
 
1.2  The Emergence of the Co-management Approach 
The failure of both the state-based and community-based models of managing wildlife and 
other natural resources to successfully fulfil goals of conservation and meet the socio-
economic needs of the local communities is regarded as the impetus for the evolution of 
collaborative management (in short, co-management) approach. The co-management 
approach (also sometimes referred to as participatory management, joint management, 
shared management, management in partnership, multi-stakeholder management or round 
table management) seeks to create negotiated agreements between the protected areas’ 
managers and other interest groups, including local resource users (Hilhorst and Aarnink 
1999; Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2000). Within the current discourse on decentralisation and 
devolution of natural resource management authority to local organisations, the co-
management approach has increasingly gained support among the common-pool resource 
experts. It fits well into the devolution process because it seeks to complement the  3
weaknesses or shortcomings of both the traditional or community-based natural resource 
management systems and the centralised strategies of the state.  
 
Meinzen-Dick and Knox (2001: 41) emphasise that the co-management approach emerges 
when the state retains a substantial role in resource management, while the role of the local 
resource users or landowners is expanded. Thus, it is different from community-based 
approach, which is characterised by more or less complete control of the natural resources 
by the local user groups. Clear differences also arise from the focus of each of these two 
approaches. While the community-based approach is people-centred and community-
focused, the co-management strategy focuses more on a partnership arrangement between 
the government, resource users or landowners and other key stakeholders in the society, and 
has therefore a broader scope and scale (Pomeroy, 2001: 119-120). 
 
Though co-management can positively contribute towards successful achievement of goals 
of conservation and socio-economic development, co-management arrangements cannot 
emerge or be effective without an enabling political framework and favourable government 
policies. A strong political support and enabling policies would particularly create incentives 
for the local resource users to participate fully in management partnerships and afford them 
protection from powerful outsiders (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2000). Co-management 
cannot also be regarded as a panacea to the problems of natural resources management, 
since, as evidenced from past studies, results of its feasibility and viability have been mixed. 
In the light of these arguments and drawing on empirical cases conducted in Kenya, this 
paper tackles two important issues that concern implementation of partnerships or co-
management projects. First, it looks at how the adoption of co-management approach has so 
far been dependent on the Kenyan wildlife conservation policy. Second, it examines how 
successful the co-management approach has been in fulfilling needs and interests of 
different stakeholder groups and mentions major challenges that are faced with the 
implementation of co-management initiatives in Kenya. The paper adds to the growing 
discourse on the relevant conditions for successful management of natural resources in 
developing countries, which, though known to be rich in biodiversity, lack the capacity for  
long-term sustainable management.  
  4
2  Shifts of Wildlife Management Strategies in Kenya in Relation to Policy 
In Kenya, which is one of the most developed wildlife-based tourism destinations in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Sindiga, 1999), searching for a sustainable approach of managing wildlife 
traces back to the 1970’s post-independent wildlife policy that gave emphasis to 
preservation of land occupied by wildlife leading to creation of numerous National Parks 
and Reserves
1. Under this strategy, hunting was disallowed and tourism activities were 
limited to land within in the protected areas. Although the policy contributed towards 
reduction of wildlife losses in protected areas (Norton-Griffiths, 2000), it led to local 
communities being evicted from their ancestral land. Since the local communities never 
participated in the establishment of the protected areas, this policy neither provided for their 
interests nor gave them access to wildlife benefits. Moreover, with seventy percent of 
wildlife living outside protected areas either on permanent or seasonal basis, greater wildlife 
losses arose from outside the parks and reserves and therefore this strategy failed to support 
the objective of total protection.   
The enactment of the Wildlife Act (also called the Wildlife Conservation and Management 
Act) by the Kenyan Parliament in 1977 (Western, 1994: 34) led to a major overhaul of the 
conservation policy. As indicated in Sessional Paper 3 of 1975 (Republic of Kenya, 1975: 
13), the new policy called for direct negotiations on the future of wildlife in dispersal areas 
between the newly created Wildlife Conservation and Management Department (WCMD) 
and the local communities. However, due to an inadequate legal framework, political and 
bureaucratic interference, and corruption, the (WCMD)
2 did not succeed in tackling the 
increased levels of human-wildlife conflicts and loss of biodiversity, which are the two 
major wildlife management problems it had been created to deal with (Kock, 1995; Honey, 
1999). Further, the local communities, who bear both direct and indirect costs of living 
together with seventy per cent of wildlife, remained excluded from direct cash benefits that 
                                                           
1 Currently the country has 26 National Parks, 28 National Reserves and one Sanctuary, which occupy 44000 
km
2 (8% of the total territory) and harbour about 25% of total wildlife populations (Watson, 1999: 1). About 
75% of wildlife animals therefore live in privately owned lands, which are adjacent to these protected areas. 
The majority of the protected areas are situated in the savannah grasslands and semi-arid lands, which 
previously had been occupied by traditional pastoralists.  
2 The WCMD was formed by combining the National Parks Board and Game Department. Though the 
National Parks Board had professional staff, those of the Game Department were corrupt and had been 
politically misused. Also, WCMD was made a department under the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife and 
therefore wildlife management continued being guided by top down policy decisions (Republic of Kenya, 
1975: 4)  5
could be derived from wildlife in their privately owned lands (Norton-Griffith, 2000: 13). 
The ‘negotiating policy’ could not allow initiation of management partnerships with local 
communities since it lacked a clear framework to facilitate its implementation.   
 
In an attempt to improve the relationship between the state and landowners in the wildlife 
dispersal areas, and curb the biodiversity losses of the 1970s and 1980s, the Wildlife Act 
was amended in 1989 and WCMD was replaced with Kenya Wildlife Service (Barrow et al., 
2001). As a semi-autonomous parastatal, Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) could raise and 
manage its own funds, hire its own staff and run its operations independently of the Ministry 
of Tourism and Wildlife, and hence, it had the incentives that its precursor (WMCD) lacked. 
During the first two years of operation, KWS drew up a new policy framework and 
development program (also known as the Zebra Book) for the period 1991 to 1996 (Honey, 
1999). Through this framework, Community Wildlife Service (CWS) was created to forge 
co-management initiatives or partnerships with communities outside the parks and reserves 
and hence enable them to derive direct cash benefits from the presence of wildlife in their 
land. By 1999, KWS had implemented such projects in the wildlife dispersal areas of 
Amboseli-Tsavo National Parks, South Coast and Laikipia-Samburu region. From the 
perspective of Kenyan conservationists these projects are considered as a major 
breakthrough in wildlife management since they have contributed towards increased wildlife 
populations and reduction of human-wildlife conflicts. 
 
The foregoing discussion supports the premise that political framework and government 
policies are an important subset of the conditions determining the application of the co-
management approach in a given region or country. However, even with a favourable policy 
in Kenya, the adoption of co-management has not been widespread. Moreover, the question 
remains as to whether this approach has been successful in reconciling the conflicting 
interests of the diverse stakeholders involved in the conservation and management of 
wildlife. In Sections 3 and 4 these two shortcomings that concern the implementation of the 
co-management approach in Kenya are discussed in detail.   
3  Extent of Adoption of Co-management in Kenya 
A country survey carried out by Mburu (2002) showed that adoption of management 
partnerships in Kenya is dependent on wildlife management policy, institutional capacity to 
co-manage wildlife, land tenure conditions and access to wildlife resources. As far as  6
wildlife policy is concerned it is evident that KWS, as the national custodian of wildlife, is 
only able to forge partnerships in areas where the current policy allows its direct 
involvement in conservation issues. As such, in the dispersal areas of the protected areas 
where it is not directly involved with wildlife management, communities can organise 
themselves into conservation groups without entering into any negotiations with KWS. Such 
community-based conservation projects are implemented under the authority of the 
respective County Councils and KWS’s role is reduced to seasonal provision of security
3 
(see Table 1). Thus, due to a weak policy that denies KWS full control and management 
rights to all wildlife resources in the country, though it owns them, it has not been possible 
to adopt co-management in all wildlife dispersal areas (Poole and Leakey, 1996). This 
implies that the claim that the failure to grant local communities property rights and non-
consumptive user rights over wildlife resources limits local communities’ participation in 
conservation initiatives (Honey, 1999; Norton-Griffiths, 2000) may not be playing a 
relatively  important role in the adoption of co-management as it is the case with the wildlife 
conservation policy and its provisions. 
 
In Kenya, adoption of co-management is favoured by owning titles to land. For instance, the 
Golini-Mwaluganje co-managed project in Coastal Province did not start off until the 
community members had acquired title deeds to their land (Kiiru, 1995), a process that was 
mainly driven by the relatively high incidences of human-wildlife conflicts. However, there 
are many dispersal areas of Kenyan protected areas where local communities fail to benefit 
from co-management due to lack of claim to land ownership since the relatively low level of 
human wildlife conflicts does not attract the attention of conservationists and government as 
was the case with Golini-Mwaluganje. This lack of land ownership weakens the bargaining 
position of such communities, making it difficult for them to seek the option of co-
management. In general, local communities with group titles to land have a relatively higher 
access to wildlife resources than private landowners with smaller units that fail to provide 
suitable habitats. Thus districts with group ranches, such as Kajiado and Laikipia, have more 
wildlife partnership activities than other areas. The land subdivision policy can therefore be 
regarded as an anti-conservation policy that create perverse incentives for the formation of 
organizations such as wildlife associations which would enter into partnerships with KWS 
                                                           
3 The county councils have also their own security arrangements. However, they are required to call for the 
assistance of KWS in situations that are difficult for them to handle and particularly if decisions to eliminate 
certain rogue wildlife have to be made and executed.  7
for the purpose of ensuring that benefits flow to the communities and losses to wildlife 
resources are reduced. 
 
Table 1: Co-management wildlife projects in Kenya: viewed from the perspective of 
KWS 
Project  Role of KWS  Co-managed 
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2) Lualenyi, Oza 




does fencing and 
makes key 
decisions 





















Security only  - 











Security only  - 









assists in fence 
maintenance, 
gives advice when 
consulted 
All stages  All activities  Delegated  8
a Since the wildlife projects were not studied in detail, only a general classification of co-management can 
be given at this stage. It is envisaged that different management tasks will have different kinds of co-
management arrangements.  
Mburu, 2002  
 
As has been pointed out by Norton-Griffiths (1997), this disincentive has greatly contributed 
to relatively higher wildlife losses in districts where land has been subdivided and is 
privately owned by individuals and where it has been difficult to organize local communities 
to form wildlife associations or user groups. 
  
Closely related to land tenure and access of wildlife resources is the capacity for the local 
community to organize themselves into a formidable stakeholder group that can negotiate 
partnership conditions with KWS and ensure effective local participation of landowners.  As 
Mburu et al. (2003) document, local communities in group ranches have a relatively high 
capacity for self-organization and access to social capital at both household and community 
levels, which, because it reduces the effects of heterogeneity, enhances their potential for 
participation in co-management. Moreover, such groups of landowners have the incentive to 
lease the co-managed area (e.g. a sanctuary) to tour operators, a strategy that results in 
efficient management arrangements and which does not only reduce transaction costs borne 
by landowners but also increases their cash benefits. Having the institutional capacity to co-
manage wildlife with KWS is therefore an important criteria which ought be considered 
when determining community groups that can successfully adopt co-management. In 
essence, without such organized groups co-management may not emerge and thus this factor 
is as important as the provision of a favorable policy framework. 
 
4.   Rating the Success of Wildlife Co-management in Kenya 
Since the partnership approach or collaborative management seeks to create negotiated 
agreements between the state and the local communities (other stakeholders may be 
included), it has been recognised in Kenya as a promising approach that offers a possibility 
to overcome conflicting interests over wildlife exploitation. However, achieving successful 
partnership is confronted with many challenges, which may eventually hinder the approach 
from becoming widespread. In this section, the criteria for assessing the success of co-
management are developed and drawing on results of a number of case studies, the situation 
in Kenya is evaluated.   9
4.1 Considerations of Criteria for Evaluating Successful Co-management 
Within the context of sustainable development (WCED, report 1987
4) and Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), three broad criteria i.e., economic, ecological, and social 
(socio-cultural), can be used to evaluate success of co-management in developing countries. 
However, considerations of success in a short-term perspective will entail further 
elaboration of these criteria. As Sen and Nielsen (1996: 409) urge, evaluation of co-
management does not necessarily entail quantification of these three components of 
sustainable development, but assessing whether co-management has positive or negative 
effects on them. The most common evaluative criteria that can be applied practically are: 
efficiency, equity and sustainability (Hanna, 1995; IFM-ICLARM, 2001). 
 
Efficiency of co-management can generally be considered in terms of cost-effectiveness 
where the lowest costs to achieve a particular or stated level of benefits is determined (see, 
for example, Kuperan et al., 1998). However, there are also situations where flows of both 
costs and benefits have to be considered (see, for example, Norton-Griffiths, 1996; Barnes et 
al., 2002; Mburu and Birner, 2002) in order to identify the level of conservation benefits that 
is efficient (allocative efficiency). The third aspect of efficiency is organisational efficiency 
(Mburu and Birner, 2002). This latter aspect involves comparison of benefits and costs in 
order to identify the organisational structure of co-management that would make it possible 
to achieve certain objectives, for example, maximum net benefits from conservation. It is 
therefore closely related to allocative efficiency. An important question in this case is as 
what kinds of characteristics or conditions (e.g. leasing conservation area to tourism 
operators) make some co-management arrangements more efficient than others both in terms 
of allocative and organisational efficiency. More, it is important to consider whether 
transaction costs (costs of participation) play any important role in influencing efficiency of 
co-management.  
 
Equity refers to fairness to all stakeholders in co-management arrangements or how the 
outcomes of the management arrangements affect the local communities in terms of race, 
ethnicity, class and gender (Hanna, 1995: 26; IFM-ICLARM, 2001: 2). It has four main 
                                                           
4 WCED Report (1987) (also called BRUNDTLAND Report) defines sustainable development as development 
which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs.  10
components which are, however, not addressed in detail in this paper. These are: 
representation, process clarity, compatible expectations and distributive effects. 
 
Sustainability in the context of the co-management can be divided into three components: 
stewardship, resilience and governance. Stewardship is defined as the tendency for resource 
users to maintain productivity and ecological characteristics of the resource (Sen and 
Nielsen, 1996: 409). In evaluating the management process in fisheries, Hanna (1995: 26-
27) identifies three components of stewardship: time horizons, monitoring and enforcement. 
If resource stewardship is to be enhanced, management should contain incentives to 
lengthen the time horizon beyond the short term, have adequate and practical systems 
devised to monitor ecological conditions and human behaviour, and lead to regulations that 
promote compliance and permit cost-effective enforcement. Resilience is the ability of the 
co-management systems to absorb and deal with changes and shocks (Nielsen et al., 1998: 
16). The co-management process is expected to have rules that are flexible enough to 
respond quickly to changing conditions and at the same time be able to adapt to both 
changes in the structure of the industry and changes in the market. Governance is mainly 
measured in terms of the level of rule compliance. Other measures may include overall 
reduction in conflict, existence of an effective conflict mechanism, and existence of practical 
and implementable enforcement procedures. 
 
4.1.1  Efficiency of the Co-management Approach in Kenya 
The first and most important challenge of co-management in Kenya has been the struggle to 
create financial incentives that could continually motivate local communities to participate 
in conservation activities (Watson, 1999).  Mburu and Birner (2002) analysis of costs and 
benefits of co-management initiatives in the dispersal areas of Amboseli National Park and 
Shimba Hills National Reserve provide useful insights into this aspect. In their financial 
analysis, local communities’ costs arising from contributions in terms of land, time and 
effort, and cash were discounted and compared with discounted revenue from the tourism 
activities. Their results showed that none of the three partnership projects in the analysis 
could be considered profitable from the local communities’ perspective. Even under 
conditions where local communities have leased conservation land to tourism business 
operators, wildlife does not earn enough revenue to offset costs arising from different 
streams such as the opportunity costs of land that is set aside for wildlife conservation; costs 
of installation and maintenance of infra-structure, such as fences, roads, offices, houses for  11
wildlife wardens, etc. and maintenance of wildlife; costs arising from destruction to 
structures, losses of human life, damages to crop and livestock production by wild animals, 
and the costs incurred to prevent such damages; direct management costs which include 
recurrent costs from reception of tourists, office work, stationery; and transactions costs 
arising from the stakeholders’ participation (see also Norton-Griffiths, 1996; Emerton, 
2001). It therefore seems likely that the partnership projects, whose costs of establishment 
were mainly subsidized by the state agencies and NGOs, may not continue to operate 
without assistance from outside. Thus creation of co-management approaches that are not 
dependent on external funding is yet to be realized in the country. Coupled to the financial 
incentives aspect is the question as to who bears relatively the bigger proportion of 
management costs (Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 2001). Mburu (2002) showed that the co-
management approach in Kenya has implied a shift in who bears the costs of wildlife 
conservation and management, from state agencies to local users or landowners, who 
particularly shoulder the burden of operational production costs of the projects. 
  
The analysis of different categories of costs of wildlife co-management by Mburu et al. 
(2003) indicated that in situations or conditions where production costs play an 
overwhelming major role, transaction costs arising from information acquisition activities, 
negotiation and operation activities of collaborative management are not a major factor 
influencing the efficiency of co-management governance structures. However, since it is the 
local communities who bear these transaction costs, it would be expected that with more 
devolution of wildlife management to well-organized and competent groups and adoption of 
co-management, the state and conservation NGOs could save some of their conservation 
expenditure at the expense of the landowners. 
 
4.1.2  Distributive and Representational Aspects of Co-management 
Distributional aspects of power and project benefits can be regarded as the second major 
challenge that may hinder the success of the co-management approach in Kenya. Drawing 
on co-management examples from Kenya and several other African countries, van den 
Breemer and Venema (1999) argue that one major condition for the approach to be effective 
is fair distribution of political power (among the stakeholders) and particularly in the 
decision-making arrangements in order for stakeholders to be socially recognized and have 
control during enforcement of rules or agreements.  Mburu’s (2002) analysis of participation 
in Kimana and Golini-Mwaluganje partnership projects also showed that co-management  12
may not be implemented successfully in conditions where the local communities are under 
represented in the management boards; their views and desires are disregarded by other 
stakeholders; management boards lack transparency in their activities; and decision-making 
process is hijacked by some of the stakeholder groups. Such unfair distribution of power 
could lead to mistrust of stakeholders and act as a disincentive for the participation of the 
local communities. According to Hanna (1995) such problems are normally related to the 
way the local communities are involved during the initial phases of the co-management 
process and particularly the negotiations. If, for example, the local communities fail to be 
fully incorporated into the co-management process at the ex ante phase, they are likely, at 
the ex post phase, to become suspicious of the importance of co-management arrangements 
leading to non-compliance with the implementation of some activities of the initial contract. 
This kind of behaviour can result in both local communities and other stakeholder groups 
incurring considerable production and transaction costs at the ex post phase, as has been 
empirically investigated by Mburu et al. (2003). But participation in co-management 
initiatives in Kenya has also been hindered by the heterogeneity of local communities, which 
is a key factor for facilitating collection action (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1999). 
Except in group ranches which are mostly occupied by Maasai and Samburu
5 ethnic groups 
(see discussion in Section 3),  most of other areas of strategic importance as far as 
conservation of wildlife is concerned are occupied by landowners who are relatively 
heterogeneous in terms of culture, social background (ethnic, race, religion, etc.) and 
economic interests. While it is possible to deal with the problem of heterogeneity by 
designing appropriate institutions (Varughese and Ostrom, 2001), such options have not 
been pursued within the Kenyan projects. 
  
4.1.3   Stewardship, Resilience and Governance of Co-management 
As reported by Norton-Grifitths (2000) and Mburu (2002), one important positive result of 
KWS forging partnerships with local communities has been the improvement of the 
condition of the wildlife resource. For instance, Mburu (2002) reports that after adopting co-
management in the dispersal areas of Shimba Hills National Reserve the elephant population 
in Golini-Mwaluganje grew to the extent that it went beyond the area’s carrying capacity 
and thus translocations to other protected areas had to be conducted.  In Laikipia District 
                                                           
5 Maasai and Samburu are closely related ethnic groups that have a similar language, are semi-nomadic 
pastoralists and have a common culture and traditions. Though they do not live in the same area, they occupy 
similar agro-ecological zones in the country.  13
where Laikipia wildlife forum (LWF) has been in partnership with KWS since 1994, 
elephant numbers in local communities’ land have also increased tremendously, prompting 
KWS to conduct several translocations to Meru National Park. As Gachigiri (2002) reports,  
more than 2,500 elephants in this area co-existed with livestock by the year 2002, after 
leaving the surrounding protected areas for better habitats outside. The wildlife count by the 
Department of Resources Surveys and Remote Sensing (DRSRS) in 1997 also shows that 
management partnerships improves the level of stewardship and contributes towards 
resource improvement. Notably, the count showed that between 1994 and 1997 wildlife 
numbers had either remained unchanged or increased in areas with management partnerships 
while in other areas losses over the same period were above thirty percent (Norton-Griffiths, 
1997). In areas were numbers have increased, wildlife animals, and particularly elephants, 
have become friendlier to human beings since their existence in the dispersal is not under 
much threat. This improvement on the nature and number of wildlife has been a great 
incentive for conservation state agencies and NGOs to continue participating and spending 
their limited resources in the co-management arrangements. With increased level of 
stewardship the local communities have, as a result of being involved in management 
partnerships, gained incentives to lengthen the time of their participation in wildlife co-
management and tourism activities beyond the short term. For example, empirical data 
collected in Golini-Mwaluganje showed that 74% of the sample landowners preferred to 
continue investing in the wildlife conservation even in the long term (Mburu, 2002b).  
 
An important impact of the partnerships, which is also related to the issue of stewardship in 
wildlife management, is the change of attitude and perception of the landowners towards pro-
conservation stakeholders and wildlife resources. Before the sanctuaries were created, the 
relationship between KWS and landowners had deteriorated to the extent that the latter had 
developed a tendency to kill wildlife secretly rather than reporting rogue animals and 
damages to the former as required by the law. However, with the presence of the partnership 
arrangements, the landowners have developed a positive altitude towards wildlife animals and 
have stopped killing them indiscriminately. Nevertheless, due to the unresolved problem of 
human-wildlife conflicts and the thorny issue of property rights allocation (Norton-Grifitths, 
2000) landowners still refer to the wildlife animals as “KWS animals”. Moreover, the local 
communities’ main interest has remained unchanged: still want to cultivate their land and do 
not desire to keep wildlife animals as an alternative (see Section 4.2.3).  
  14
Whether or not the co-management arrangements in Kenya are flexible enough to absorb 
shocks and deal with changes (e.g. in markets, organisational aspects, etc.) depends mainly on 
landowners’ organizational capacity and the type of management arrangements adopted in 
different regions. With a ‘delegated
6’ type of co-management e.g. in Kimana (see Table 1), 
the landowners are able to adapt to changing conditions easily. For example, the Kimana 
landowners were able to reach a decision to lease their conservation area to a tour operator 
after failing to cope with the marketing burden which was bringing their revenues down. The 
landowners of Golini-Mwaluganje, on the other hand, had a ‘co-operative’ type of 
arrangement, which means that their decisions have to be approved by a conservationists-
dominated board in order to be implemented. Landowners who are not well organized are also 
more predisposed to outside influence, particularly from local politicians. Such external 
influence also adversely affects how the management board reacts to changing conditions and 
therefore the success of the partnerships. 
The levels of compliance with rules and the handling of conflicts within the conservation 
areas can be used to gauge how effective the governance of the wildlife resource under co-
management is.  However, analysis of compliance with rules in many of the areas where co-
management has been adopted in Kenya are rare. It is therefore difficult to comment 
whether with the adoption of co-management governance of wildlife resources in the 
dispersal are has been improved or otherwise.  
 
4.2  Other Challenges Faced with Implementation of Co-management in Kenya  
4.2.1   Losses of Biodiversity and Landowners’ Sites of Socio-cultural Values 
There are no empirical studies done in areas where the co-management approach has been 
adopted that can be relied on in assessing whether the increase of wildlife numbers, and 
particularly elephants, has had adverse effects on other forms of biodiversity. Although 
Mburu and Birner (2002) did not incorporate the costs of such degradation effects in their 
economic analysis, they report that the increased number of wildlife has resulted in losses of 
other kinds of biodiversity. This has particularly been experienced in the dispersal areas of 
Shimba Hills National Reserve where the considerable high population of elephants have 
                                                           
6 In ‘delegated co-management’ the government hands over authority to make decisions to user groups who are 
responsible for informing government of these decisions. In ‘cooperative co-management’ the government and 
user groups cooperate together as equal partners in decision making. The latter is viewed as the idealised type of 
co-management.  15
destroyed a number of endangered trees’ and bushes’ species in and around Mwaluganje 
Forest Reserve. In this same region, the landowners have also lost their shrine areas or 
Kaya
7 forests, which have been local communities’ sites of socio-cultural values for many 
years. Mburu (2002b) also documents that due the high density of wildlife in Kimana 
Sanctuary, the beautiful canopies of acacia trees, including important species such as Acacia 
xanthoploea and A. abyssinica, have greatly been degraded.  Such environmental losses to 
the society, which can be viewed as negative external costs of wildlife management, cannot 
however be underrated when adopting and implementing the co-management approach. 
  
4.2.2  Inbreeding and Hindering Free Movement of Big Mammals 
Due to the fencing off (using electric fences) of the areas designated for wildlife 
conservation in order to separate them from the farms and communities’ dwelling areas, the 
free movement of the big mammals has been restricted. Such a fencing strategy has, as 
expected, reduced the level of human-wildlife conflicts but has on the hand decreased the 
size of the grazing area that the elephants used to enjoy, forcing them to cloud in small, 
enclosed areas. In Golini-Mwaluganje sanctuary, for example, Kiiru (1995) reported that 
although the elephants could move freely between the sanctuary and Shimba Hills National 
Reserve, they could no longer reach other grazing areas bordering the sanctuary (such as 
Tsavo East National Park) as they used to before the creation of the co-management 
projects. This lack of free movement has resulted in the inbreeding of the elephants and a 
rapid increase of their population in the sanctuary. For instance, during the 1995 aerial 
census it was estimated that the density of elephant population in the sanctuary was about 2 
elephants per km
2 (Kiiru, 1995). But within a span of 5 years this population density had 
risen tremendously to about 7 elephants per km
2 while that of adjacent Shimba Hills 
National Reserve stands at about 3 elephants per km
2 (Mburu, 2002). However, there are no 
studies done in this area to indicate the negative effects that this high population of wildlife 
coud have on the environment and the society.  Thus, it would be of paramount importance 
to assess the implications that inbreeding of wildlife and their lack of free movement could 
have on the future of the co-management projects.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
7 The Kaya used to be the homesteads of the Mijikenda ethnic groups. Their location in dense forests and hill-
tops was meant for avoiding attacks from raiding tribes. Today they are treated as shrines, which are of cultural 
and religious significance.  16
Mburu (2002) also reports another problem associated with the fencing strategy in co-
management projects. He found that in the dispersal areas of Amboseli National Park 
fencing off the sanctuary area from important gazing areas and watering points of elephants  
has not only hindered free movement of the animals but has also resulted in diversion of 
crop destruction to new areas which never used to experience this menace before creation of 
the tourism projects. This negative impact arises since after creating the co-management 
projectss the wildlife density and diversity has increased to the extent that it is difficult to 
contain the animals all the time in the fenced areas. As a result, crop destruction costs are 
also borne by landowners who are not living the project areas and therefore not involved in 
the co-management. This also demonstrates how complex investing in wildlife co-
management can be for the participating stakeholders and how high levels of uncertainty 
with wildlife could lead to unanticipated production costs to the society.  
      
4.2.3  Altering the Economic Interests of the Local Communities 
In analyzing the livelihood strategies of the local communities live together with wildlife, 
Bourn and Blench (1999) found that pastoralism, and particularly the nomadic pastoralism 
of the Maasai and their indigenous knowledge, are compatible with wildlife conservation. 
However, the analysis of interests by Mburu (2002b) showed that these communities are 
still not comfortable with the presence of wildlife in their land. Even after introducing 
partnerships or co-management, the landowners do not view wildlife conservation as a 
sustainable way of earning a household income and thus the objective of making wildlife-
based economic activities become the communities’ ‘second cattle’ (Western, 1994) is still 
far from being realised. The communities’ greatest desire has remained to have all the 
wildlife kept away or be fenced off of their land. The presence of wildlife is regarded as a 
threat to the farming activities which many of the landowners dependent on for their 
livelihood. The wildlife is also considered as a great threat to their security and as a 
hindrance to the performance of other economic activities. Thus wildlife conservation 
through co-management has failed to be recognized as a livelihood option by the 
landowners. This may most likely be emanating from the fact that wildlife co-management 
is financial viable to the landowners as has been argued in Section 4.1.1. 
 
The desire for communities to have the wildlife fenced off their land may also be emanating 
from the distribution of the land, and wildlife ownership and management property rights as 
has been highlighted in Section 4.1.3. Moreover, this desire has been greatly cultivated by  17
the savings in guarding costs and losses from crops and livestock that the landowners have 
received from the fence installed in certain areas.  The landowners’ main interest is therefore 
to enhance farming activities in order to make full benefits out of the investments in 
electrical fencing. This obviously contrasts with the pro-conservation stakeholders’ desire of 
making wildlife conservation and tourism an alternative form of land use to the farming 
practices of the local communities in order to enhance, through minimization of human-
wildlife conflicts and costs, the co-existence of wildlife and humans. To an extent, the 
landowners’ behaviour is also related to their perceptions that the best option for wildlife 
management in their local areas is to have the KWS play a relatively bigger role even in the 
event of adopting the co-management approach (Mburu, 2002). 
 
5  Concluding remarks 
This paper started by looking at the evolution of different strategies of wildlife management 
in Kenya, and generally in developing countries, in order to examine some of the factors or 
conditions that lead to emergence and subsequent adoption of the co-management approach. 
It is clear from the analysis carried out here that co-management has become popular among 
conservationists and development practitioners due to the shortcomings of both the 
centralised management and community-based approaches to fulfil the conflicting interests 
of diverse stakeholder groups. It has been emphasised that the major condition favouring 
adoption of the co-management approach in a developing country like Kenya is the 
provision of a favourable policy to the implementing agency and devolution of management 
roles to organized user groups which have the institutional capacity to co-manage wildlife 
resources. Other factors that are also important in this respect include land tenure conditions 
that allow community members to own private land as a group and accessibility to wildlife 
resources. 
 
Although wildlife co-management in Kenya has been successful in terms of reduction of 
human-wildlife conflicts and securing increases in wildlife numbers, not all the interests of 
the stakeholders have been met. The landowners, in particular, have to contend with the fact 
that there are considerably high production costs and transaction costs involved in the 
management activities, making the co-management projects financially unprofitable. This 
may be the main reason why the local communities have not been able to change their 
economic interests and make wildlife management a major livelihood strategy which could  18
also form a substitute for the subsistence farming. Notwithstanding, the reduction of human-
wildlife conflicts and hence the increase in crop and livestock produce, and security for 
human beings can be regarded as key incentives that play an important role in motivating 
long-term involvement of local communities in the partnerships or co-management projects. 
 
A key challenge facing co-management initiatives in the country is the involvement 
heterogeneous community groups who lack the capacity to participate effectively. In 
addition, problems associated with the application of the fencing strategy, for example, 
increased inbreeding and prevention of free movement of large mammals, increased losses 
of other forms of plant and animal diversity, etc., will need to be addressed. These problems, 
including the loss of local communities’ socio-cultural wealth, have to be regarded as 
externalities of the co-management or costs borne by the society which may adversely affect 
the success of this approach in the future. Thus, one important policy implication is that 
these negative impacts of the co-management approach and its failure to produce financial 
incentives will have to be dealt with by conservationists and policy makers in Kenya before 
this strategy of managing wildlife resources in the dispersal areas of protected areas 
becomes widespread in the country.   
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